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TWO TYPES OF BELIEF REPORT
ABSTRACT: Ascriptions of belief and other doxastic proposi-
tional attitudes are commonly interpreted as quantifying over a
set of possible worlds constituting doxastic alternatives for the
belief experiencer. Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) has argued that be-
lief predicates and other stative attitude predicates, along with
stative predicates generally, lack a Davidsonian event argument
and therefore do not report on any eventuality (event or state).
Hacquard (2010), in contrast, assumes that all attitude ascrip-
tions describe an event corresponding to the mental state of
the attitude experiencer. The present investigation suggests that
the strengths of doxastic predicates can be modeled by gener-
alized quantifiers over the doxastic alternative set, permitting
us to formulate and test predictions based on standard interac-
tions of these quantifiers with negation when these ascriptions are
negated. This provides a middle ground between Katz and Hac-
quard, whereby some belief ascriptions are interpreted as nothing
more than a quantified condition over a doxastic alternative set,
while others attribute a Davidsonian belief state to the experi-
encer. In the latter case, the condition involving quantification
over doxastic alternatives is an essential content condition which
serves to individuate the eventuality described by the belief re-
port, and to identify it across possible worlds.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) argues that a theory of the interpretation of
stative sentences does not require us to posit states of the world which
are described by such sentences, and that phenomena explained by
doing so are better explained without such states. Correspondingly,
Katz argues, if we adopt a Davidsonian approach to the interpretation
of action sentences, we should not posit Davidsonian state variables
in the argument list of stative predicates, or in the representations of
the meanings of stative sentences which we construct with them. Katz
includes stative propositional attitude ascriptions such as ascriptions of
belief in the scope of this proposal.
Hacquard (2006, 2010) proposes, to the contrary, that all attitude
ascriptions have an associated event or state, with a corresponding
event variable.
In this paper, I chart a middle course, finding reason to distinguish
two types of propositional attitude ascription. One type has no asso-
ciated event or state; it simply states a condition on possible worlds
according to whether or not they are consistent with the propositional
attitude being ascribed. The other type is interpreted as characterizing
a mental state, an emotional state, or an act of assertion, which I take
the attitude verb to introduce as one of its arguments. In this second
type, the content condition involved in the first type of interpretation
is used as a criterion of individuation of such an event or state, and
of its identity across possible worlds. For both types, I propose that
differences in strength can be captured in terms of the quantificational
force of different generalized quantifiers. For reasons of space, the dis-
cussion in this article is limited to belief ascriptions.1
For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that a sentence of
natural language is interpreted by interpreting its LF phrase structure
tree compositionally in a model M, following the practice of Heim &
Kratzer (1998).
2. BELIEF ASCRIPTIONS
Belief ascriptions can be called doxastic reports, since they report on
the doxastic state of the experiencer subject.2 Consider the belief as-
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criptions in (1).
(1) Sam believes / thinks / expects that the President will resign.
To interpret these, suppose that the experiencer subject, Sam denotes
the individual a3 in the domain D of M, and that S1 = the President
will resign is the LF structure of the complement clause.3 Then the
belief ascription in (1), following common practice, can be interpreted
in M by quantifying with a universal quantifier over the set of doxastic
alternatives for the experiencer, representing ways the world could be
according to the experiencer’s beliefs. Letting DA(a3, w) be the set of
doxastic alternatives of Sam in the possible world of evaluation w, we
can write truth conditions for (1) in M, as in (2).
(2) [[ Sam believes that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff ∀v ∈ DA(a3, w): [[ S1 ]]
M,w
= 1
As a first step toward generalizing this approach to a wider range of
attitude ascriptions, I first seek to extend it to predicates which are in-
tuitively stronger or weaker than believe. This is undertaken in section
2.1. The intuitions regarding the relative strengths of these predicates
are illuminated and made manifest when ascriptions with them are
negated; this is taken up in section 2.2.
2.1. Variation in Strength
Now consider the ascriptions in (3).
(3) Sam is sure / certain / convinced that the President will resign.
These seem to make a stronger statement about Sam’s doxastic alter-
native set than any of the ascriptions in (1). But if we interpret them
as involving quantification over the set of Sam’s doxastic alternatives,
there is no evident way to make the interpretation stronger than the
truth conditions formulated in (2) other than by the addition of an
otherwise unmotivated strength modifier. If the truth conditions in
(2) “max out” on the dimension of strength that seems relevant to the
difference between (1) and (3), then there is a problem formulating
suitable truth conditions for the stronger ascriptions in (3).
The ascriptions in (4) seem to make a weaker statement about
Sam’s doxastic alternative set than (1).
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(4) Sam imagines / suspects that the President will resign.
Based on (2), it would be natural to suppose that the ascriptions in
(4) have analogous truth conditions with an existential quantifier over
DA(a3, w). But there are two problems with this supposition. First,
this would make (4) paraphrasable as “Sam thinks it is possible that
the President will resign,” or, “Sam cannot rule out that the President
will resign,” which seems to be too weak an interpretation. If Sam can-
not rule out that the President will resign, this isn’t enough to make
(4) true unless Sam also thinks that the possibility of a resignation is
high enough to be salient, even if not high or salient enough for (1)
to be true. Second, and related to this, Kai von Fintel notes (personal
communication), that if imagine and suspect had the quantificational
semantics of existential quantification over the set of doxastic alter-
natives of the experiencer subject, then ascriptions with these verbs
would have the force of a possibility modal (though quantifying over
a different domain), and thus, alongside sentences such as It is possi-
ble that the President will resign and it is possible that the President will
not resign, we should find a sentence such as the following to be fe-
licitous: #Sam suspects that the President will resign and Sam suspects
that the President won’t resign. This expectation is not borne out; such
sentences are infelicitous. So imagine and suspect are stronger than
mere existential quantification, and stronger than mere possibility, but
weaker than believe and expect.
We have encountered a series of doxastic predicates, (imagine, be-
lieve, be sure), which differ from one another primarily just in strength,
for which truth conditions of the sort given in (2), with standard logi-
cal quantifiers ∀ and ∃, seem to be inadequate. This suggests that we
replace the quantifier in (2) by a generalized quantifier of appropri-
ate strength. Following Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1979, 1981, 1989),
generalized quantifiers show up not just in quantified noun phrases,
but in the interpretation of conditionals and sentences restricted by
when-clauses. If we are to adopt an analysis of doxastic predicates
as quantifying over a set of doxastic alternatives, we should use gen-
eralized quantifiers of appropriate strength. With reference to a wider
range of quantificational phenomena, this section will provide evidence
that be sure is the analog of the determiner quantifier every, the adverb
of quantification always, and the modal operator must, and that believe
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is the analog of the determiner quantifier most, the adverb of quan-
tification usually, and the modal operator should. Let EVERY be the
generalized quantifier for this first group, and MOST be the general-
ized quantifier for the second.4 On this basis, we might have expected
that suspect and imagine would have the force of the generalized quan-
tifier SOME, manifested in the determiner quantifier some, the adverb
of quantification sometimes, and the modal operator might. But this is
not tenable, as discussed above. I leave the quantificational force of
suspect and imagine unspecified for now, to be determined in section
2.2. Letting Q be the undetermined generalized quantifier for suspect
and imagine, the results of this analysis of doxastic predicates are given
in (5).
(5) a. [[ Sam is sure that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
(EVERY v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ S1 ]]
M,v = 1
b. [[ Sam believes that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
(MOST v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ S1 ]]
M,v = 1
c. [[ Sam suspects that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
(Q v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ S1 ]]
M,v = 1
The right-hand sides of these conditions express three different set-
theoretic relations in the model between the sets DA(a3, w) and {v: [[
S1 ]] M,v = 1}. The discussion of section 2.2 below provides further
support for these proposals, where the value of Q will be determined
through its interaction with negation.
The doxastic alternative set of Sam, DA(a3, w), at a world of evalu-
ation w, is the set of possible worlds consistent with what Sam believes
in w. Let us understand possible worlds to be possible ways the world
could be (or is). I take the set of possible worlds consistent with what
Sam believes to be very large, since I assume that if u is any possible
world in DA(a3, w), consistent with what Sam believes in w, and v is
a possibility that differs from u in some way which we can articulate
and which makes no difference to Sam’s beliefs, then v is a member of
DA(a3, w) too, distinct from u. The generalized quantifiers in (5) thus
have substantial sets on which to operate. I will assume here that these
sets are nevertheless finite, so we can employ the standard semantics of
generalized quantifiers. If the sets of possibilities were infinite, further
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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apparatus involving sample sets and probability distributions could be
introduced to achieve the same purpose.5
2.2. The Value of Q
The naturally occurring example in (6a) was uttered by tennis an-
nouncer John McEnroe in commentary before the Wimbledon final
round match between Venus Williams and Marion Bartoli on July 7,
2007; the examples in (6b,c) are constructed.
(6) a. I’m not sure Venus will crumble like Henin did yesterday.
b. I’m not sure we can get in there.
c. Sam’s not convinced that the President will resign.
Example (6a) was uttered with some tentativeness, appropriate in light
of Bartoli’s consistency through the Wimbledon fortnight, and a ten-
dency toward inconsistency in the play of Venus Williams. It could be
suitably paraphrased as, “Venus might not crumble like Henin did yes-
terday.” The predicate be sure is intuitively a strong doxastic predicate;
the negated ascription in (6a) has a much weaker value, as suggested
by the paraphrase. The same is true of the constructed examples in
(6b,c).
To interpret (6a), we use (5a), negating the truth conditions for
I’m sure that S2, where S2 = Venus will crumble like Henin did
yesterday, and a1 is the speaker, resulting in (7).
(7) [[ I’m not sure that S2 ]]
M,w = 1 iff (SOME v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ ∼S2
]]M,v = 1.
That is, (6a) is true just in case it is at least possible that Venus will
not crumble as Henin did. This result is consistent with the paraphrase
given above. Thus, we can interpret (6a) by using classical negation-
quantifier interactions to import negation, converting the generalized
quantifier in the lexical representation of the attitude predicate to its
dual. I will call this Neg-Importation with Dualization (NID).
Can we do this for an ascription with believe, as in, The Senator
doesn’t believe that the bill will pass, using (5b)? Taking believe in isola-
tion, it is hard to say what its dual is. Partly this stems from the intrinsic
vagueness of most.
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Instead, put negation with believe aside for the moment, and con-
sider negation with imagine and suspect, as in (8).
(8) a. Sam doesn’t imagine that the President will resign.
b. I don’t imagine we can get in there.
c. I don’t imagine you can lend me a hundred dollars.
The best paraphrase of (8c) is along the lines of, “I expect that you
can’t lend me a hundred dollars.” The form in (8c) is a more polite
form of the request than, “Can you lend me a hundred dollars?” be-
cause it is interpreted as in the paraphrase just given, as asserting that
the addressee probably can’t make the loan, thus taking pressure off
the addressee to comply with the indirect request. The predicate imag-
ine is intuitively somewhat weaker than the mid-point of the scale for
belief ascriptions, and what we get when we negate it, as in (8c), is an
ascription with strength somewhere above the mid-point of that scale.
This holds for the other ascriptions in (8).
Using (5c), we interpret (8a) as in (9), where Q⊥ is the dual of the
generalized quantifier Q.
(9) [[ Sam doesn’t imagine that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
(Q⊥ v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ ∼S1 ]]
M,v = 1.
The ascription in (8a) has (at least approximately) the force of Sam
believes that the President will not resign. This suggests that MOST is (at
least approximately) the dual of Q in (9), that is, Q⊥ = MOST, which
means that MOST⊥ = Q. Now we can interpret Sam doesn’t believe
that S1 using (5b), to interpret a negated belief ascription as having
the force of imagine, as in (11); this gives us the interpretation of the
negated sentence in (10) under the “Neg-Raising” interpretation on
which negation is associated with the lower clause. This interpretation
of (10) can be paraphrased as, “Sam is inclined to believe that the
President will not resign.”
(10) Sam doesn’t believe that the President will resign.
(11) [[ Sam doesn’t imagine that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
(MOST⊥ v: v ∈ DA(a3, w))[[ ∼S1 ]]
M,v = 1 iff
(Q⊥ v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)) [[ ∼S1 ]]
M,v = 1.
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Predicates such as believe have strength somewhere above the mid-
point of the doxastic scale, but below the top of the scale, which is
occupied by be certain and be sure. The dual of believe is correspond-
ingly weaker than the mid-point. How much weaker depends on the
exact force of the original predicate, which I assume, following (5b), to
have the force of MOST. Applying the general rule in (12), we see that
if MOST means >70%, for example, then MOST⊥ (= Q) corresponds
to ≥30%.
(12) ∼(Qx: A(x)) B(x) iff (Q⊥x: A(x)) ∼B(x)
In the limiting case where MOST means “more-than-half”, MOST⊥ cor-
responds to “half-or-more,” which is just slightly weaker than “more-
than-half”. (If it is not the case that more-than-half of A are B, then
half-or-more of A are not-B.) The stronger the meaning of MOST, the
weaker the meaning of MOST⊥ = Q. I allow that MOST can mean N%,
for some N within the range 50 ≤ N < 100 depending on speaker and
context. But for most uses, MOST (and therefore believe) will be in-
terpreted with N around 75, midway between the mid-point and the
top of the scale, since believe needs to have sufficient distance between
be certain and be sure at the top of its scale, and sufficient distance
from its own dual, suspect and imagine, lying at a mirror-image point
on the other side of the mid-point. That way, suspect and imagine have
the strength of a weak version of believe (“inclined to believe”), some-
where below the mid-point of the scale, but well above the strength of
a possibility modal. This is in accord with the fact that it is infelicitous
to say, #Sam suspects that the President will resign and (Sam suspects)
that the President will not resign, since this is akin to saying that Sam is
inclined to believe p and inclined to believe not-p.
3. EVENTS AND STATES
The interpretations given in (5) relate the doxastic state of the belief
experiencer to the content of the belief complement for a range of dox-
astic attitude predicates. In other propositional attitude reports, it is
clear that more must be going on. For example, a report of attitude
assertion, such as Sam said that the President will resign, is a report
of an event, a saying event, in which the content of the complement
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clause and the doxastic state of Sam and his addressees somehow fig-
ure. These are beyond the scope of the present paper. But the literature
is divided on whether plain belief ascriptions such as that in (1) like-
wise report on something going on in the world, namely, an event or
state corresponding to what is going on in Sam’s head, and this is di-
rectly relevant to the topic of the present paper. I take it up in section 4
below. In order to address this issue, it is necessary to first review some
ideas on the individuation and identification of objects and events, and
their role in semantic theory.
3.1. Individuating Objects and Events: Part-whole relations and causa-
tion
The ontology of events assumed here is essentially that outlined in the
“Events” chapter of Lewis (1986), with the role of part-whole relation-
ships on events as elaborated by Moltmann (1997). A similar view is
sketched by Carlson (1998). The view, in sum, is that events are indi-
viduals in the world and, as such, they participate in multi-dimensional
part-whole relationships in the same way as other individuals. How
we delineate events, and the relationships among them, depends on
the interests and purposes that motivate or inform us in undertaking
the delineation. This has implications for the identification of events
across possible worlds. Events can have counterparts across possible
worlds, but which events participate in the counterpart relation—and
thus count as “the same event”—depends on our interests and pur-
poses, just as with other individuals.
Compare this view of events with the situation of physical objects,
whose part-whole structure can be delineated along various dimen-
sions, at various levels of granularity. The breakdown of an automo-
bile engine along functional lines might result in a small number of
relatively complex parts, such as the fuel injection system, the cool-
ing system, the electrical system, and so on. Some of the components
in such a functional breakdown, such as the electrical system, can be
quite distributed in space. The parts causally interact with one another,
and may interpenetrate one another in intricate ways. In a more atom-
istic delineation of physical parts, the entire engine might break down
into a fairly large number of simplex objects, including nuts, bolts,
plates, fans, belts, hoses, wires, and electronic sensor components, and
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Two Types of Belief Report 10
a few large simplex objects, such as the engine block and the radiator
box. The objects we delineate as parts of the engine depend on the
dimension and level of granularity chosen, which in turn depend on
our purposes in making the delineation.
Following the lead of Lewis (1986) and Moltmann (1997), a simi-
lar approach will be adopted here for events. If three children, Keisha,
Kieran and Kevin, are hopping about in a room together, we can indi-
viduate the event of all three of them hopping, and we can individuate
three distinct sub-events, one for each child’s hopping. With sufficient
motivation, we can even individuate distinct sub-events consisting of
any two of the children hopping. At a lower level, we can identify
each hop by a single child as a sub-event, and at a lower level still, the
impact of the child with the floor upon his or her descent in a given
hop as a further sub-event. If Keisha twists her ankle while hopping,
we can identify the larger event of the children hopping as the cause
of this mishap (they shouldn’t have been hopping on a concrete sur-
face), or the sub-event of Keisha’s participation in the hopping, or her
last, wayward, hop, or the impact upon descent from this hop, when
the ankle was injured. Combinations of events usually do not com-
pose larger events, but sometimes they do, just as amalgamations of
objects do not usually compose a larger object, but they sometimes
do. This leaves open questions about the resolution of sub-events in a
descending sequence of ever-smaller sub-events, parallel to analogous
questions about the smallest components of matter. These questions
about sub-event resolution can have significance for semantic theory,
as Eckhardt (2005, 2008) has argued. But these questions don’t have
to be fully settled in order for us to appeal to a domain of events in a
Davidsonian semantic theory, any more than physics has to settle com-
parable questions about the composition of physical objects before we
can define a domain of physical objects for semantic theory.
3.2. Davidsonian Semantic Theory with Lewis’s Conception of Events
Turn now to the interpretation of a typical action sentence such as (13)
in Davidsonian semantic theory.
(13) Max kicked the ball.
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The standard Davidsonian interpretation of (13) would assign it the
truth conditions in (14) in M, at world of evaluation w, where the
bold-faced rendition of the sentence is its LF phrase marker, a5 and a6
are members of the domain D of M, the referents of Max and the ball,
respectively, and e4 is a member of a special subset of D, the set of
individuals that are events.6
(14) [[ Max kicked the ball. ]]M,w = 1 iff ∃e4 [kick (a5, a6, e4)]
Davidson assumed that events are individuated according to their causal
relationships: one event is identical to another just in case they have
the same causes, and the same effects. As a result, there is a unique
event e4 whose existence is asserted by (14). If the ball breaks a win-
dow, sparking a lawsuit and other entanglements, these results are all
results of the impact of Max’s foot with the ball. And if we tried to iden-
tify e4 as a larger event, any cause of this larger event would be a cause
of the impact of Max’s foot with the ball. For Davidson, the choice of e4
as the event being described is quite determinate, since all events with
the same causal efficacy as e4, which might also be described by (13),
are in fact identified with e4.
In contrast, in line with the discussion in section 3.1, I assume that
Max kicked the ball can be used to describe any event in which the par-
ticular kicking of the ball by Max took place, and the granularity chosen
will reflect our interests and purposes. For some purposes, e4 would be
taken to be a very local event, encompassing the impact of Max’s foot
with the ball, and little else. For other purposes, this impact might be
simply a salient part of a larger event in which the ball broke a win-
dow and thereby initiated a feud between neighbors. We can take (13)
to assert the existence of an event at some level of granularity, which
has the smallest event of Max kicking the ball as a (possibly improper)
sub-event. To this end, interpret the predicate of (13), kicked the ball,
consisting of VP and Aspect, as in (15) below, asserting the existence
of an event e4, at some level of granularity or other, which can be char-
acterized by the condition ‘x kicked a6’ in the model.
7 Composing with
the subject DP Max, we obtain the truth-conditions in (16).
(15) [[ kicked the ball. ]]M,w = λx∃e4 [Part-of e4: x kicked a6]
(16) [[ Max kicked the ball. ]]M,w = 1 iff ∃e4 [part-of e4: a5 kicked a6]
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The idea might be clearer with the more storied example in (17).
(17) Buck shot Ed.
The event described by (17) could be very small, centered about the
squeezing of the trigger by Buck, as in, In that second, just as Bill entered
the room, Buck shot Ed. Or the granularity could be larger. In discussing
a spy operation, (17) could be a report on one of the “achievements”
of the spy agency during the month of March, an elaborate operation
involving weeks of planning, leading up to Buck shooting, and thereby
assassinating, Ed. (Achievement number 16: Buck shot Ed.) This usage
is also seen in the example in (18), where Sam reminds Bill of a party
they attended, at which Buck shot and wounded Ed, a commotion en-
sued, and it took three hours after the police and ambulance arrived
for things to settle down to the point that Sam and Bill could leave; in
this report, Sam’s use of the demonstrative that refers to a rather larger
event consisting of the shooting and its aftermath.
(18) Remember, we had a drink in the bar downstairs and talked
to Maria for a while. Then Buck shot Ed. After that, we left
and went to a diner for a late snack.
On this view, the granularity is determined by context or ostension, as
needed. This is possible since the required “size” of the event intended,
in which Buck shot Ed, with some antecedent lead-ins and some sub-
sequent consequences possibly tacked on, can be circumscribed by its
spatio-temporal boundary. Variation across possible worlds would serve
to fix the granularity to a finer grain since the lead-ins and conse-
quences of the pulling of the trigger could vary across possible worlds
and still permit identification as the “same event” as in the actual
world. But the pulling of the trigger, caused (directly or indirectly)
by Buck, resulting in the bullet hitting Ed, is common across all trans-
world variants of the event.
In this paper, I am, in effect, adopting Davidson’s semantics for ac-
tion sentences in the context of Lewis’s (1986) view of events. For
Lewis, an event is a property of spatio-temporal regions, and thus can
be identified (extensionally) as a class of regions, at most one per pos-
sible world (p.245). We can take the Davidsonian interpretation to
assert the existence of an event at a chosen level of granularity, where
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a coarser grain typically corresponds to a larger spatio-temporal re-
gion. Lewis notes the difficulty in trying to identify an event uniquely
through a description of the event. But such difficulties shouldn’t sur-
prise or disturb us. Individuals have properties, but it is typically hard
to specify individuals uniquely by description, except by using rela-
tional properties which identify the individual in terms of its relation
to other individuals (e.g., a is three feet due north of b). The difficul-
ties involved in uniquely describing an event are parallel: it is easy
to uniquely specify an event using relational properties to delimit an
event, fix its granularity, and place it in space and time. In this, events
simply share in the behavior of other complex individuals.
Before returning to belief reports, let us take a momentary digres-
sion on trans-world identity - how we identify individuals and events
as the “same individual” or the “same event” across possible worlds.
3.3. Identifying Individuals and Events across Possible Worlds
In the classical example of the ship of Theseus, the planks of the ship
are replaced one by one, as the ship continues to sail and dock at ports,
until all the planks have been replaced, at which point the discarded
planks are re-assembled, reconstituting the original ship. In this exam-
ple, we can identify the physically reconstituted ship assembled from
discarded planks as the “same ship” as the original, if sameness of ma-
terial constitution is most important to us, or, alternatively, we can
identify the result of plank-by-plank substitution as the “same ship,” if
spatio-temporal continuity is most important. We might have different
individuative criteria, yielding different results, depending on our in-
terests and purposes. For tax purposes, with concern for the operation
of the ship as it sails the sea and puts into port, spatio-temporal conti-
nuity might be paramount. For purposes of historical preservation, to
create a museum display of the physical ship which was sailed during
key historical events and which bears historically inflicted scars and
marks, the ship assembled from discarded planks might be paramount.
In a variant of the ship of Theseus example, we can imagine the
original ship persisting untouched in the actual world, wo, while the
process of removing and replacing planks one by one, and then phys-
ically reassembling the discarded planks, all happens in a world w′,
distinct from wo. At a given point in time after the reassembly of the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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planks is complete in w′, we can ask which ship in w′ is the counterpart
of the ship in the actual world: the one which has maintained spatio-
temporal continuity with what was previously the unambiguous coun-
terpart of the actual ship, and which has (we will assume) continued
to sail missions and put into port in w′ as its planks were replaced one
by one, or the museum ship reassembled from the discarded planks?
The answer depends on our criteria of cross-world identity, which in
turn, depend on our interests and purposes.
We can pose similar problems for the individuation and identifica-
tion of events across possible worlds. Suppose that Max works for the
CIA. One night, in the actual world, wo, Max types up and prints a
list of CIA agents who work abroad, along with their contacts, and ar-
ranges to meet with Maria, whom he knows to be the agent of a hostile
power, on the pier, at midnight. He gives her the list, thus betraying his
country. In another world, w′, Max creates the same list, and meets the
same person Maria at the same spot on the same pier at the same time,
and gives her the list; but in w′, Max knows that Maria is a friendly
double-agent, and by giving Maria the list, he is making it possible for
a warning to be sent to the listed agents and their contacts, thus pre-
venting them from being compromised and arrested. Ten minutes later
in w′, however, sitting in his office, Max changes his mind and with the
press of a key on his computer keyboard, transmits the list to the agent
of a hostile power. Which of the two events in w′ is the counterpart of
the event in the actual world? If the physical execution of the action
is used as the criterion of identity, then the counterpart event will be
that of Max meeting Maria on the pier at midnight, and handing her
the paper with the list of names printed on it. That might be identified
as the “same event” if what we are tracking is how Max caught a chest
cold which aggravated his acute bronchitis and caused him to die two
days later (in both wo and w′). If the functional significance of the
event and its ramifications for the spy agency and the country are used
as criteria of identity, then the physically quite different event of Max
pressing the button on his computer keyboard in his warm, cozy office
is the counterpart event.
Thus, indentifying counterparts of individuals or events across pos-
sible worlds involves specification of criteria of identity, dependent on
our interests and purposes.
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3.4. A Role for Content
In a step toward the interpretation of belief ascriptions, consider ex-
amples in which ordinary individuals are endowed with content. To
this end, suppose we are standing in a room of a long-abandoned man-
sion, taking stock of the furniture and art which are sitting about, dusty
and displaced, but otherwise still in good condition. One of us points
to a painted portrait of Benjamin Franklin, and utters (19a), referring
to two windows in the room, or (19b), referring to the colonial era
portrait artist Joseph Siffred Duplessis.
(19) a. The portrait of Benjamin Franklin must have hung between the
two windows.
b. The portrait of Benjamin Franklin must have been painted by Du-
plessis.
We approach the interpretation of the modal statements in (19) accord-
ing to a theory of identity across possible worlds in terms of finding a
best counterpart for the purposes and interests at hand. Would the
interpretation of the modal include worlds in which the best counter-
part of the portrait was a portrait with nearly the same spatio-temporal
history as the actual one, but one which happened to be a portrait
of an obscure contemporary of Franklin? That depends on the pur-
poses and interests of the participants in the discourse. If the portrait
and other objects are being addressed simply as items of furniture and
decoration in (19a), with no regard for the content or historical signif-
icance of who is depicted in the portrait, then the interpretation of the
modal would not strongly favor possibilities in which the portrait was
of Franklin, but instead, might favor possibilities in which the portrait
counted as the “same item of furniture,” by virtue of a shared or similar
spatio-temporal history as furniture. The modal interpretation would
then include worlds in which the portrait was of someone else, and
count it as “the same portrait” for the purpose of a statement about
what sort of furnishings the room had. An otherwise similar possible
world to the actual one, in which the portrait is of someone else and
didn’t hang between the two windows, could count as falsifying (19a).
In contrast, in a suitable context for (19b), where the fact that the por-
trait is of Benjamin Franklin is critical to the purposes and interests
of the conversation (for example, one concerned with the historical
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or monetary value of the portrait), worlds in which the same canvas
was used for a portrait of an obscure contemporary of Franklin’s, and
subsequently underwent the same spatio-temporal journey, would not
be included. If there is such a world, otherwise similar to the actual
world, in which the portrait is of someone else and not by Duplessis,
this would not falsify (19b) since the portrait would not count as the
same portrait, and so this world wouldn’t be included in the evaluation
of the modal statement. When the content is critical, the content of
the portrait is a major factor (usually the decisive one) in identifying it
across worlds.
This example illustrates the point that for objects endowed with
content, in contexts where we care about that content, the content has
a role in identifying the object across possible worlds. The same is
true of events, which I regard equally as individuals in the semantic
ontology, subject to identification across possible worlds: when they
are intrinsically associated with content, we can identify them in terms
of that content across worlds. This result will be employed in the next
section.
4. BELIEF ASCRIPTIONS AND EVENTUALITIES
Returning to stative doxastic ascriptions with predicates such as believe,
the truth conditions in (5) interpret these as bare quantified conditions
on a set of doxastic alternatives, not as asserting the existence of an
event or state of belief, that is, not as akin to the Davidsonian interpre-
tation of an action sentence in (16).
This result is fully in line with Katz (2000, 2003, 2008), who ar-
gues that stative sentences in general, and stative attitude ascriptions
in particular, do not describe events or states which should be seman-
tically represented using a Davidsonian event or state variable. Katz
(2000, 2003, 2008) argues that the extension of the Davidsonian anal-
ysis from action sentences to sentences with state predicates is flawed
since it predicts a symmetry between eventive and stative predicates
for adverbial modification, nominalization, and a host of other prop-
erties, a symmetry which Katz claims does not obtain. Katz (2000)
argues that these symmetries break down quite generally. Katz (2003,
2008) argues that each class of stative predicate, and each type of VP-
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modifier, must be considered in its own right, and that doing so yields
a variety of more satisfactory analyses of the interpretations of stative
predicates and their modifiers, undercutting the rationale for extension
of the Davidsonian analysis to stative predicates.
Katz (2008) proceeds by examining arguments for the existence of
stative eventuality variables given in the literature. Katz argues that
temporal modifiers analyzed along the lines of ‘for-a-long-time (e)’ and
‘at-midnight (e)’ on the neo-Davidsonian approach can be analyzed just
as well, if not better, as predicates of times.8 Additionally, he argues
that state predicate modifiers such as completely (e.g., in John loves
Mary completely) or well (e.g., in John knows French well) are better
analyzed as degree modifiers. Katz notes that stative predicates exhibit
a high degree of lexical selectivity for particular modifiers, with vari-
ation in this selectivity even among stative predicates of the same se-
mantic type, implicating a lexical (or distributed morphological) anal-
ysis of them. (E.g., John knows French well and John loves Mary com-
pletely, versus # John knows French completely and # John loves Mary
well). Furthermore, he notes that event-denoting bare infinitive com-
plements to perception verbs of the sort exhibited in (20) do not have
state-denoting counterparts of the sort shown in (21).
(20) John saw Maria perform the song.
(21) a. ∗John saw Mary own a car.
b. ∗John saw the socks sit on the floor.
Interpreting (20) as a relation of perception between the experiencer
subject of see and the event described by the bare infinitive comple-
ment Maria perform the song, as in (22), the lack of a corresponding
interpretation of (21a,b) follows from the supposition that there is no
corresponding event or state variable to serve as the denotation of the
bare infinitive complements Mary own a car and socks sit on the floor.
(22) ∃e1 ∃e2 [(Part-of e1: a9 performs a14 ∧ (Part-of e2: a8 performs e1]
Katz’s arguments, cited above, are convincing to the effect that tempo-
ral and aspectual modifiers do not provide good evidence of a David-
sonian variable for any predicate. His argument that manner modifica-
tion of a stative cashes out as manner modification of associated events
is less straightforward. For example, Katz analyzes (23) as making an
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implicit generic statement about events which mark John’s behavior
towards Mary, asserting that they are characterized by passion.
(23) John loves Mary passionately.
We might question whether this conflates epistemological or evidential
issues concerning (23)—What would lead someone to assert it?—with
issues of its semantic meaning. Of interest here is whether this would
be adequate for the analysis of the contribution of this adverbial, and
others like it, to the interpretation of belief ascriptions such as (24).
(24) a. Max passionately believes that Mary murdered Bill.
b. Max arrogantly believes that he is the greatest novelist alive.
c. Max honestly believes that Maria is the best chess player in the
world.
In order to avoid positing Davidsonian events or states in the inter-
pretation of these ascriptions, we might say that the adverbs in (24)
merely denote a property of the experiencer, Max. Then the ascrip-
tions in (24) would have standard Davidsonian representations in (25)
below.
(25) [[ Max believes that Si ]]
M,w = 1 and passionate / arrogant / honest
(a5)
But these are inadequate since they don’t tie Max’s passion, arrogance,
or honesty in any way to his belief. We don’t merely want to say that
Max has a belief with the content Si , and he is passionate (or arrogant,
or honest, etc.). And the adverbials in (24) would not have to be used
in such a way as to reflect degrees of belief, or to have behavioral
correlates in associated events. Although they can be used in this way,
they can, in addition, be used in ascriptions where the interpretation
does not reduce to degrees or manner in associated events. Consider,
for example, Max arrogantly believes that he is the greatest novelist in
the world, even though he is always humble in demeanor. This can be
used to express the judgment that Max is arrogant or presumptuous
in having the belief in question. We could analyze this as saying that
Max is arrogant because he believes he is the greatest novelist in the
world, or arrogant in that he believes he is the greatest novelist in
the world. Either of these serves to underscore the incompleteness
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(at best) of the interpretation in (25). A more promising approach to
the interpretation of the adverbials in (24) would be to add one of
the terms ‘passionate / arrogant / honest (a5, e4)’, relating Max to the
respective belief state, to the interpretation of each sentence.
Evidence that points more specifically toward a neo-Davidsonian
variable associated with some instances of stative attitude ascriptions
with predicates such as believe and think (on the stative use of think) is
the pronominal reference in examples such as (26)–(27), where (26a)
or (27a) is the utterance of a speaker, and (26b) or (27b) presents
three options for a follow-up utterance, either by that speaker, or by an
addressee of the (a) utterance.
(26) a. Alex believes that Mary murdered Bill.
b. i. That began/started last March.
ii. That has lasted long enough.
iii. The forensic pathologist’s report will put a stop to that.
(27) a. Alex thinks that everyone is talking about him.
b. i. That began/started last month.
ii. That has lasted a long time.
iii. His therapist will put a stop to that.
The predicates of initiation, persistence, and cessation which take the
demonstrative that as their argument in (26b) and (27b) do not sensi-
bly or comfortably apply to facts. And although we might follow Katz in
taking temporal adverbials such as at midnight to be predicates of time
intervals, it does not seem sensible to interpret (26b-iii), for example,
as asserting that the pathologist’s report will put a stop to a time inter-
val. It is more straightforward for that to refer to Alex’s belief or belief
state in (26b) and (27b). When we use responses such as (26b) and
(27b) in a context where the antecedent of that is to be retrieved from
a sentence with an indisputably stative predicate, we obtain examples
such as those in (28) and (29).
(28) a. Mary owns the car.
b. i. That began last March.
ii. That has lasted a long time.
iii. My lawyer will put a stop to that.
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(29) a. The socks sit on the floor.
b. i. That began this morning.
ii. That has lasted long enough.
iii. Billy’s mom will put a stop to that.
The use of that to refer to the states described by the (a) sentences is
distinctly odd in (28b-i) and (28b-ii), and likewise in (29b-i) and (29b-
ii). In (28b-iii), we can readily understand that the lawyer might find
a legal means to nullify Mary’s ownership of the car, or to transfer the
ownership to another person, but “put a stop to that” seems at best a
colorful way to put this. If we take it literally, the speaker’s lawyer is
understood to be not actually stopping Mary’s ownership of the car, but
something more like putting a stop to an aggressive campaign by Mary
to acquire ownership of articles in which the speaker has an interest
(e.g., in a messy divorce case). In (29b-iii), we understand that Billy’s
mom will put a stop to events of Billy leaving socks on the floor, or
Billy’s habit of leaving socks on the floor, not to a current state in which
the socks sit on the floor.
So even if we accept Katz’s arguments that the bulk of stative pred-
icates do not modify a Davidsonian state, it seems that stative attitude
predicates such as believe and think can introduce an associated state,
as an interpretive option. A plausible reason for this is that we can in-
terpret these ascriptions as describing attitude states which can engage
in causal interactions in examples like (26) and (27); such interactions
underlie Davidson’s conception of an event. The formal concomitant
for why these predicates can behave in the ways noted above, but (at
least most) other stative predicates don’t is that these predicates can
have an associated Davidsonian state variable in their argument struc-
ture, which makes them subject to forms of modification and anaphoric
reference in exactly the way that sentences with eventive predicates
are.
But here we run into a problem. Recall how Davidsonian events
figure in the interpretation of an action sentence such as Max kicked the
ball. Attempting something analogous for S = Sam believes that S1,
for S1 = the President will resign, using the truth conditions in (5b)
to capture the role of the content of S1, we obtain the truth conditions
in (30). (Recall that a3 is Sam.)
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(30) [[ S ]]M,w = 1 iff ∃e4 [part-of e4:
believe(e4) ∧ EXP (a3, e4) ∧ (MOST v: v ∈ DA(a3, w)[[ S ]]
M,w
= 1 ]
This isn’t right. A belief ascription does not characterize a physical part
of e4. The quantified condition over DA(a3, w) is not “what is going
on” in e4. In the interpretation of an eventive belief ascription, the re-
lationship between the eventuality e4 and the content of the interpreted
clausal structure S is different. The eventuality e4 should be associated
with the doxastic alternative set of the experiencer somehow, but not
in the way that an eventuality is associated with objects and relations
among them which constitute the eventuality, as part of it.
Hacquard (2010: 101) proposes something similar to my treatment
of events for belief ascriptions, but without the physical part-of rela-
tion. She proposes that the doxastic alternative set involved in the
interpretation of (1) is an informational doxastic context of the experi-
encer subject, on which the ascription reports. The doxastic alternative
set is regarded, in this light, as a function which takes the eventuality
of the belief experiencer on which the speaker is reporting as an argu-
ment. On Hacquard’s account, (1) introduces the eventuality e4, the
doxastic state of Sam, which is experienced by Sam and characterized
by a set of possible worlds DA DA(a3, e4, w) consistent with Sam’s be-
liefs at a given point in the discourse, and asserts that S1 is true in it.
Translating into the notation of this paper, and replacing Hacquard’s
universal quantifier with the generalized quantifier MOST in order to
more accurately reflect the strength of the belief ascription, Hacquard’s
(2010: 101) approach would interpret (1) as in (31).
(31) [[ S ]]M,w = 1 iff ∃e4 [belief (e4, w) ∧
Exp(a3 e4) ∧ (MOST v: v ∈ DA(a3, e4, w) [[ S ]]
M,w = 1 ]
A distinctive property of this interpretation is that it doesn’t tie the
eventuality e4 to the content of S1 in any uniquely identifying way. If
Sam believes ten different things, expressed by Si (i = 1, . . . , 10), at
a given point in time, these could all characterize a single eventuality
e4, according to (31). Or each Si could characterize its own eventu-
ality ei . More generally, there could be any number of eventualities,
between 1 and 10, each characterized by some subset of {Si: i = 1,
. . . , 10)}. In this respect, Hacquard’s approach is similar to the David-
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sonian approach to physical events sketched in section 3.2 above. In
that approach to (16), we don’t necessarily pick out the smallest event
in which Buck shot Ed (say, the event confined to the moment in which
the trigger is squeezed). Instead, we recognize that one could use the
sentence in (16) to describe an event at various levels of granularity.
Some of these events are quite large and can be characterized by many
different sentences, describing their different parts. Others are more
minimal, more centered about the squeeze of the trigger, and are de-
scribed by few sentences—possibly, in the limit, only by this sentence
and its passive counterpart. As noted in section 3.2, we could go across
possible worlds and get the result that all events of Buck shooting Ed
have the sub-event of the trigger squeeze in common, while differing
in lead-ins and consequences. Nevertheless, it seems that we could in-
dividuate the event chosen, at whatever level of granularity, even in
the actual world, by its physical boundaries. If we refer to an event
anaphorically after it is introduced in this way, the appropriate level of
granularity will be established by context or ostension, to the degree of
precision necessary for the purposes of the discourse.
It doesn’t seem possible to take this approach with the eventuality
associated with a belief ascription because there are no physical bound-
aries that would delineate the part of e4 which corresponds to belief in
S1, as opposed to parts which correspond to belief in S2, . . . , S10. The
condition in (31) does not use the truth of the complement clause (in
possible worlds in the doxastic alternative set) as a criterion of individ-
uation or identity of an eventuality within which a belief that the Presi-
dent will resign is realized or instantiated. As a result, in examples like
(26) and (27), for the interpretation of, Alex believes that Mary mur-
dered Bill, or Alex thinks that everyone is talking about him, (31) does
not provide a unique eventuality which can serve as the antecedent of
the anaphor that in the follow-up options (26a,b,c) and (27a,b,c). We
need something which will serve to tie the actual belief in the content
of S1 to the eventuality introduced in (31). For intentional states such
as belief, this can only be done by conditions on identity across possible
worlds. Such a condition will now be formulated.
We want the ascription expressed by the whole sentence S to state
a quantified condition on Sam’s doxastic alternatives, (MOST v: v ∈
DA(a3, e4, w) [[ S1 ]]
M,w = 1. This condition characterizes e4 not by
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specifying a part of e4, “what goes on” in e4, nor one content condition
among others that e4 might have, but rather, it specifies an identifying
condition on e4, no matter what else might be the case. This condition
is how we individuate e4; it is what makes e4 what it is. If we interpret
a belief ascription such as (1) as introducing an eventuality e4, the
ascription tells us that the condition in (5b), (MOST v: v ∈ DA(a3, e4,
w) [[ ϕ ]]M,w = 1, is an identifying condition on e4, in that it holds in
any possible world in which Max experiences e4. This is formulated in
(32).
(32) [[ Sam believes that S1 ]]
M,w = 1 iff ∃e4 [ [[ EXP (a3, e4) ]]
M,w = 1
∧
(∀u: [[ EXP (a3, e4) ]]
M,u = 1) (MOST v: v ∈ DA(a3, u)): [[ S1
]]M,w = 1 ]
That is, there is a state experienced by Sam, and any possible world
u in which he experiences it is characterized by the essential content
condition in (5b). The condition ‘believe (e4)’ is left out since the status
of e4 as a belief state is captured by the quantified condition over the
doxastic alternative set, with its distinctive strength.
So at this point, I am claiming that the doxastic ascriptions in (1),
(3) and (4), repeated below, with believe, think, be sure, be convinced,
suspect, and imagine, can be uttered with two different interpretations.
(1) Sam believes / thinks / expects that the President will resign.
(3) Sam is sure / certain / convinced that the President will resign.
(4) Sam imagines / suspects that the President will resign.
They can have the “bare” or minimal interpretations given in (5a,b,c),
or they can have corresponding full or eventive interpretations along
the lines given in (32). Anaphoric reference to an eventuality can be
diagnostic of the full interpretation. In (26) and (27), the follow-up
options in (26b) or (27b), whether uttered by the speaker of the (a)
sentence or by an addressee of the (a) sentence, presuppose that the
(a) sentence has the full interpretation, providing an eventuality to
serve as referent of the demonstrative anaphor that.
The behavior of negation can be diagnostic of which interpreta-
tion is in force in a given example. In (6), (8), and (10), with the
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lower interpretation of negation as in (7), (9), and (11), I propose that
the un-negated counterpart Sam believes that the President will resign
is interpreted as in (5a,b,c), and that negation converts the general-
ized quantifiers EVERY, MOST and Q to their respective duals, SOME,
Q, and MOST, through the process of Neg-Importation with Dualization
(NID), yielding the lower-Neg reading. But the simple belief ascriptions
in (1), (3) and (4) should also have the full eventuality-introducing in-
terpretations along the lines of (32), as an interpretive option, with
an appropriate strength of quantifier over a doxastic alternative set.
When we negate ascriptions such as (1), (3) and (4) and obtain an
interpretation with wide scope negation (barring nuclear stress on a
constituent within the scope of negation), this should indicate that the
full interpretation is in force, even in the absence of other cues to that
interpretation. This would be the case for the first sentence of (33),
pronounced with nuclear stress on not, uttered by an aide to the Sen-
ator to deny rumors that the Senator believes that the President will
resign as the result of a scandal involving one of his policies, without
committing the Senator to any fixed opinion about the outcome.
(33) The Senator does not believe that the President will resign.
She believes that the President will decide on the right course
of action, to resign or not, in due course, when all of the facts
come to light.
Turning to Davidson’s argument from adverbial modification, I take
Katz’s point that each form of adverbial modification should be ad-
dressed in its own right; spatial, temporal, manner, and degree modi-
fiers should not all be interpreted identically. And eventualities should
not be posited to support an account of the interpretation of a class of
adverbials unless doing so provides the best account of the semantics
of that class. Returning to the examples in (24), we can formulate a
Davidsonian approach to each using the full interpretation of doxastic
ascriptions of the form given in (32), but the fact that we can formu-
late them doesn’t mean that they are correct. On such an approach,
the adverbial modification in (24) adds one of the conditions in (34).
(34) passionate (a3, e4) / arrogant (a3, e4) / honest (a3, e4)
This condition would not be part of the identity condition on e4 across
possible worlds, so it should be placed outside the scope of the trans-
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world identity condition. This is shown in (35), for (24a) with S2 =
Mary murdered Bill.
(35) [[ Max passionately believes that S2 ]]
M,w = 1 iff
∃e5 [ [[EXP (a5, e5) ∧ passionate (a5, e5)]]
M,w = 1 ∧
(∀u: [[ EXP (a5, e5) ]]
M,u = 1)(MOST v: v ∈ DA(a5, u)): [[ S2
]]M,w = 1 ] )
On this approach, the presence of the adverbial requires the eventive
interpretation of the rest of the sentence, of the form given in (32), as a
basis to which to add the contribution of the adverbial, rather than the
“bare” condition on possible worlds in the doxastic alternative set, of
the sort given in (5b). This interpretation seems appropriate for (24a),
where the secondary predicate passionately relates Max to his belief
state, and the belief state is characterized by the cross-world content
condition. This approach works for (24b) as well, interpreting it as
asserting that arrogance is a property of Max in relation to his state
of believing that he is the greatest novelist alive. The approach would
interpret (24c) as asserting that there is a state of Max in which he
believes that Maria is the best chess player in the world, and honesty
is a property of Max in relation to that state. This may not be the only,
or best, interpretation of (24c), and this illustrates the point that I am
following Katz in analyzing each modifier in its own right, even as I
depart from Katz in adopting a Davidsonian eventuality variable for
some stative ascriptions.
Hacquard (2010) assumes that all belief ascriptions have an asso-
ciated Davidsonian state of belief. This serves her account of modal in-
terpretation, by which an epistemic modal sentence occurring as com-
plement to a propositional attitude predicate qualifies an event or state
associated with the attitude by a condition on the doxastic alterna-
tive set of the attitude experiencer; Hacquard construes this set as the
epistemic modal base. In (36), for example, the epistemic modal is in-
terpreted, according to Hacquard, as qualifying an eventive belief state
of Sam.
(36) Sam believes that it must be raining.
Hacquard claims that this is parallel to the interpretation of an unem-
bedded modal, It must be raining, as qualifying the event of assertion
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by a condition on the doxastic alternative set of the speaker. This anal-
ysis is based on Hacquard’s proposal that the doxastic alternative set is
an informational context in the sense of Stalnaker (1998), and should
be identified as the epistemic modal base of the associated modal state-
ment. Thus, in (36), there is a belief state of Sam which is character-
ized by Sam’s doxastic context, which serves as the epistemic base of
the embedded modal; similarly, the doxastic context of the speaker of
an unembedded modal statement serves as the epistemic modal base
of that statement. I cannot do full justice to this proposal here. But I
can note that the epistemic modal base of an unembedded modal state-
ment has been argued to be the set of possible worlds consistent with
what the speaker knows, not with what the speaker believes.9 Assuming
sufficient transparency, anything known by the speaker is believed, so
the set of worlds consistent with what the speaker believes is a proper
subset of the set of worlds consistent with what the speaker knows
(since the former must be compatible with what the speaker knows,
and with further propositions that the speaker believes but does not
know). On the basis of these results, the epistemic modal base would
be decoupled from the doxastic context of Sam in (36) (or the speaker
of an unembedded modal statement). The belief event characterized
by the doxastic context would then fail to serve as a grounding of the
epistemic modal base, which would remove Hacquard’s rationale for
positing it. I leave the discussion at that point here, simply noting that
research on the nature of the epistemic modal base blunts the rationale
Hacquard proposes for associating an event with each attitude ascrip-
tion.
5. CONCLUSION
If ascriptions of belief involving a clausal complement S1 to the atti-
tude predicate are interpreted in terms of quantification by general-
ized quantifiers over a set of possible worlds constituting doxastic al-
ternatives for the experiencer of the attitude, then variation in strength
across doxastic predicates can be modeled by the interpretations of
the generalized quantifiers. The resulting interpretations permit Neg-
Importation with Dualization, accurately predicting the strengths of
ascriptions with the “lower Neg” reading traditionally associated with
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Neg-Raising. But some belief ascriptions have a more complex inter-
pretation. In some cases, the more complex interpretation may be
invoked by certain types of adverbial modifiers. One kind of more
complex interpretation, revealed by pronominal reference facts, is one
which posits a belief state, an eventuality which is associated with the
belief, identified across possible worlds in which it occurs by the quan-
tified condition over doxastic alternatives, and serving as an essential
content condition on the belief state eventuality. This view contends
with Hacquard (2010) and agrees with Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) in
accepting that stative attitude ascriptions are not invariably associated
with a Davidsonian eventuality, but contends with Katz in arguing that
we can’t fully dispense with such Davidsonian eventualities in the inter-
pretation of belief ascriptions since some ascribed beliefs are associated
with an eventuality.
This provides a semantic analysis of a distinction long noted in
the literature, and recently discussed by Cappelli (2007) and Simons
(2007), between belief ascriptions which attribute a mental state to
the experiencer subject versus those whose “main point” (in the ter-
minology of Simons) is to comment on the truth or evidential status
of the complement clause as judged by the experiencer subject, with
implications for the speaker. In the latter case, Urmson (1952) charac-
terizes the content of the main clause as “parenthetical,” meaning that
the entire ascription is understood to be a presentation of the content
of the complement clause, evidentially qualified by the strength of the
attitude predicate.
Notes
1I am grateful to Kai von Fintel, Barbara Partee and Susan Rothstein for comments and
discussion when I presented this and related work at the Sixth International Symposium
of Cognition, Logic and Communication in Riga, and to Ann Mulkern and an anonymous
reviewer for subsequent comments.
2This was observed by Hintikka (1969). Major steps in implementing the idea were
taken by Heim (1992).
3Natural language expressions in bold-face type denote the LF syntactic structure of
the expression. A cited or mentioned expression, regarded as a string of words, will
be italicized. A syntactic category label in bold-face type, with or without an identifying
subscript, denotes an LF tree structure dominated by a category of that label. In ordinary
type-face, the label refers to the syntactic category.
4An anonymous reviewer wonders whether should has the force of MOST, as sug-
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gested here, and whether this is consistent with its occurrence in a short discourse such
as the following: “Given what we know, they should be here by now. But they’re not.”
The discussion here does not definitely establish that believe has the force of MOST, and
due to space limitations, cannot address the question whether should has the force of
MOST. But if should does have the force of MOST, the discourse bit in question is inter-
preted as follows: “Given what we know, in most possible worlds they are here now. But
in the actual world, they’re not.” We predict this to be felicitous.
5Alternatively, given sets of possible worlds A and B, whether finite or infinite, we
could use the modal quantificational schemas proposed by Kratzer (1981, 1991), with
(EVERY A): B interpreted as analogous to modal necessity. Essentially, if A is the modal
base, then the proposition corresponding to the set of possible worlds B must be true
relative to this base. Then (SOME A): B could be interpreted as analogous to modal
possibility, and (MOST A): B interpreted analogously to weak necessity (the force of
modal should).
6See citetdavidson67, Higginbotham (1983, 1985, 1989, 2000), and Parsons (1990),
among others.
7The existential quantifier is introduced by the Aspect node, which could aspectually
qualify e4 in other ways.
8See Parsons (1990) for elaboration of neo-Davidsonian semantics, which posits the-
matic role predicates relating agents and experiencers, patients and themes, and other
participants in an event, to the event itself.
9More precisely, the literature argues that the epistemic modal base is the set of pos-
sible worlds consistent with what is known by the speaker, or a group of which the
speaker can be considered a member. See DeRose (1991) and von Fintel and Gillies
(2008a, 2008b), as well as discussion of the role of an assessor by Egan (2005) and by
Egan et al. (2005).
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